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New Requirement for Search Warrants
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The fourth and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution' provide the basic safeguards against unreasonable and illegal
searches and seizures. Unreasonable searches and seizures are prevented by requiring an officer to obtain a search warrant before he
legally may search any private premises. The requirements necessary
to obtain a search warrant are set out in the fourth amendment:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.2
This amendment is written in broad language and, in interpreting
its provisions, the Supreme Court also has tended to speak in terms
of general principles.' The exact minimum requirements for the
issuance of search warrants have not been determined specifically.4
The most difficult portion of the fourth amendment to define
and apply is that which refers to "probable cause." Although the
definitions have varied somewhat,' a basic definition has begun to
evolve. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within
the arresting officer's knowledge or of which he had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.! Thus, by definition, the facts and circumstances of the
individual case will determine whether "probable cause" exists for
the issuance of a warrant. For probable cause to exist, the party
signing the affidavit must have information or knowledge amounting
to more than a suspicion.' The affidavit, however, need only set forth
facts sufficient to allow a reasonable man to believe that a crime
' U.S. Const. amend. IV; U.S. Const. amend. V. Although the fifth amendment is mentioned in search and seizure cases, it is rarely relied on as a criterion for decision since the
fourth amendment is particularly applicable.
'U.S. Const. amend. IV.
'See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1924); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 253, 262-63 (1825).
" See authorities cited in note 3 supra.
5See, e.g., Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Weller v. Russell, 321 F.2d
848 (3d Cir. 1963); Chapin v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 477, 296 S.W. 1095 (1927).
SKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1924).
7Adams v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 43, 128 S.W.2d 41 (1939).
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has been or is being committed; it need not establish guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, as required for conviction.'
The standards to be applied in a state court to determine the
validity of a search warrant were unsettled until 1961. Prior to that
time, evidence seized in contravention of the fourth amendment,
although inadmissible in federal courts,' was not prohibited from admission in state courts.'" In that year, the United States Supreme
Court, in Mapp v. Ohio," held that illegally seized evidence, acquired
either with or without a warrant, was not admissible in state courts.
The "exclusionary rule" set out in Mapp is based on the fourth
amendment and is applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.12 The states, however, still are not precluded from adopting
their own working rules with regard to search warrants, provided
they do not violate the accused's constitutional rights."
The holding in Mapp did not have the tremendous impact upon
Texas procedure that it had upon the procedure of several other
states. Already in effect in Texas was a statute which adopted the
"exclusionary rule."" This statute, however, refers only to evidence
excluded on the basis of federal constitution and laws; it does not
apply to evidence inadmissible in federal courts under the Supreme
Court's supervisory power."
II. THE

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE

In order to determine whether constitutional standards of probable cause have been met, an impartial magistrate must pass upon the
sufficiency of the search warrant and the affidavit upon which it is
sJones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945).
9Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
,'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
1367 U.S. 643 (1961). That holding was restated in 1963, when the Supreme Court
held that the standard for obtaining a search warrant was the same under the fourth and

fourteenth amendments. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
"2U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
iaKer
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
4
1 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 727a (1953). "No evidence obtained by an officer
or other person in violation of any provision of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of this State shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any
criminal case."
'5Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). A few cases have arisen in which warrants
were struck down because of failure to comply with certain requirements of The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure even though they met the constitutional requirements of
showing probable cause. See United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1963);
United States v. Brougher, 19 F.R.D. 79 (W.D. Pa. 1956). These cases were decided on
specific provisions concerning federal procedures of executing the warrants. Since these decisions were based on supervisory powers rather than constitutional requirements, they are
not binding on the state courts.
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based.' In general, federal courts have followed the premise that "the
informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to
issue warrants . . . are to be preferred over the hurried action of
officers . . who may happen to make arrests."" Such heavy reliance
on judicial interpretation may tend to discourage those searches which
possibly might be made without a search warrant because, if the
search warrant is based on a magistrate's interpretation and decision,
the reviewing courts accept evidence of a less "judicially competent
or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting
on his own without a warrant.'"" The decision of the validity of a
search warrant is left to the individual magistrate's discretion and
will not be reversed unless there is an obvious abuse of that discretion." This preference for judicial determination of constitutional
standards for search warrants represents an effort to protect the individual's rights under the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments
from possible abuse by "the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.""
The facts necessary to enable a magistrate to determine whether
the "probable cause" required to support the warrant exists must
be set out in an affidavit signed and sworn to by the one seeking the
warrant."' It is clear that facts must appear on the face of the affidavit
sufficient to allow the magistrate to decide whether the requirements
for probable cause have been met," but the federal decisions have
been vague concerning the specificity with which these facts must
be stated.' Mere affirmation of suspicion or belief without further
disclosure of supporting facts or circumstances has never been a
sufficient statement of probable cause in federal courts." Moreover,
an affidavit which simply states that one is guilty of a crime is not
a sufficient statement of facts for the determination of probable
cause.

Hearsay evidence is acceptable if it provides sufficiently definite
16

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Rozner v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 127,

3 S.W.2d 441 (1928).
'"United
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). See also, Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Johnson v. United States, snpra note 16.
"Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
"Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957).
0
" Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
" Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
"Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
"See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 35 (1963); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 162 (1924); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 253, 262-63 (1825).
HGiordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Nathanson v. United States, 290
U.S. 41 (1933).
" Giordenello v. United States, supra note 24; United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712
(2d Cir. 1960); Hagen v. United States, 4 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1925).
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information. " An affidavit based on hearsay evidence clearly is sufficient if it contains facts which allow the magistrate to pass on the
credibility of the information as well as the reliability of the informer."7 It is necessary also that the affiant state that he believes the
statements of the third party to be true."8 If the affiant relies on his
own observation and knowledge, he must state clearly those facts
upon which probable cause can be based."'
Within the limits of the constitutional requisites as interpreted
prior to 1964, Texas courts have been fairly liberal in upholding the
validity of search warrants. If the affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that (1) the affiant had reliable information from a
credible person and (2) that he believed that information, such a
statement was sufficient to establish probable cause." Probable cause,
however, could not be determined if affiant only stated that he believed and had reason to believe that certain facts existed.31 Such an
affidavit could not set before the magistrate the facts necessary to
show probable cause and was held to be an attempt to substitute the
judgment of the affiant for that of the magistrate." . The Sixth and
the Second Circuits have held that if the affidavit contains both
statements, it satisfies the constitutional standards.33
III.

AGUILAR

v. TEXAS

This type of affidavit was re-examined in Aguilar v. Texas.' Two
police officers applied for a warrant to search for narcotics in the
appellant's home. The affidavit on which the warrant was based
stated that the affiants had received reliable information from a
credible person and did believe that certain narcotics were being
kept by Aguilar (petitioner). In an attempt to execute the warrant,
the officers forced their way into the house and seized the appellant
as he tried to dispose of a packet of the narcotics. The court of
" Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960); United States v. Meeks, 313 F.2d 464 (1963).
27 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d
712 (2d Cir. 1960).
28United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962).
"' United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1960); Evans v. United States, 242
F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957); Garhart v. United States, 157 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1946).
' Davis v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 2, 302 S.W.2d 419 (1957); Clinnard v. State, 149
Tex. Crim. 472, 196 S.W.2d 522 (1946); Weaver v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 134, 138
S.W.2d 1081 (1940); Rozner v. State, 109 Tex. Crim. 127, 3 S.W.2d 441 (1928).
a'Ruhmann v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 527, 22 S.W.2d 1069 (1929).
a32Ibid.

"'United States v. Meeks, 313 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Eisner, 297
F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); United States v. Ramirez,
279 F.2d 712 (2d Cir. 1960).
4378 U.S.

108

(1964).
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criminal appeals upheld the issuance of the search warrant, holding
that the affidavit showed probable cause." Similar affidavits frequently had been upheld in the Texas courts."' The United States
Supreme Court reversed and held that the affidavit did not set forth
sufficient facts to show probable cause."
In holding the affidavit unconstitutional, the Supreme Court relied especially on the cases of Nathanson v. United States' and
Giordenello v. United States."' In the Nathanson case, the affiant
stated that he had "cause to suspect and did believe that certain
merchandise"4 was on the described premises. The Court held that
the affidavit "went upon a mere affirmation of suspicion and belief
without any statement of adequate supporting facts,"41 and that
specific facts or circumstances must be presented to the magistrate so
that he can determine whether probable cause exists. In the Aguilar
case, the Court said the vice in the affidavit was at least as great as
that in the Nathanson case, because only conclusions as to probable
cause made by the officers were stated in the affidavit without the
benefit of impartial judicial interpretation of the facts that had
prompted these conclusions." Mr. Justice Clark, however, speaking

for the dissent in Aguilar," distinguished the two cases. He said that
nothing in Nathanson suggested that any facts had been brought
out to support a belief or suspicion, while in Aguilar the affidavit was
based not only on "affirmance of belief" but also on "reliable information from a credible person."44 The dissent, therefore, placed great
importance on the additional information that a credible informer
had given the officers reliable information. Whether such additional
information would have made any difference in the Nathanson decision is highly questionable.

In the Giordenello case, the affiant swore that the appellant "did
receive, conceal, etc. narcotic drugs . . .with knowledge of unlawful
importation."'" The Court said that the affidavit was insufficient because no basis was given for any sort of judicial determination of
probable cause. It neither gave facts nor sources to support the
" Aguilar v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 629, 362 S.W.2d 111 (1962).
'"Griffey v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 338, 327 S.W.2d 585 (1959); Davis v. State, 165
Tex. Crim. 2, 302 S.W.2d 419 (1957); Ruhmann v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 527, 22 S.W.2d
1069 (1929).
7
" Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
3'290 U.S. 41 (1933).
39357 U.S. 480 (1958).
40Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. at 44

(1933)7

41Id. at 46.
42378 U.S. at 113.

41Id. at 116. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart joined in the dissent.

44Id. at 118.

4'Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 481 (1958).
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stated conclusion of appellant's guilt." In the instant case, the Court

said that there was no appreciable difference between Aguilar and
Giordenello. The magistrate must be informed of the underlying
circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informer
was credible or reliable." Again, the dissenting justices in Aguilar
distinguished the case from Giordenello. Their first contention was
that Giordenello had been decided under the supervisory powers of
the court given by rules 3, 4, and 41c of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The majority, however, correctly stated that
the Court in Giordenello had construed the requirement of "probable
cause" contained in rule 4 of the federal rules in the light of the
fourth amendment requirement of probable cause which that rule
implements. The requirements announced in Giordenello ultimately
derived, therefore, not from the Court's supervisory powers but
from the fourth amendment." The dissenting Justices also said that
even if the decision could not be distinguished on the theory that it
was based upon the Court's supervisory powers, the Giordenello case
could be distinguished from the Aguilar decision because Giordenello
did not indicate a source for the affiant's belief or "any other sufficient
basis upon which a finding of probable cause could be made," ' while
Aguilar stated that the information had come from a reliable source.
Although there is a distinction between the two cases, very narrow
analysis would be required to make this distinction controlling. The
theory behind the Aguilar decision is that there must be a judicial
determination of probable cause; the mere addition of an assertion
that the information has come from a reliable source would not increase appreciably the magistrate's ability to make such a determination. Thus, it is doubtful whether Giordenello would have been upheld simply because of an additional statement that the information
had come from a reliable person.
Regardless of the interpretation of the rationale of the holding,
Aguilar establishes a constitutional requirement that the magistrate
must be informed of some of the underlying facts or circumstances
from which the affiant concluded that a crime had been or was being
committed, and some of the underlying facts or circumstances from
which the affiant concluded that the informer, whose identity need
not be disclosed," was credible. Only full compliance with these
"Id. at 486.
47378 U.S.

at 114.
41Id. at 112.

"4Id.at I19.
30Ibid.

"' Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
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requirements can show the requisite probable cause for the issuance
of a search warrant by state officials under the fourteenth amendment
or by federal officials under the fourth and fifth amendments.
IV. CONCLUSION

In the short time since Aguilar was decided, it has drawn much
criticism, some of which is valid. One of the most forceful points of
criticism concerns the case in which an informer is relied upon to
establish "probable cause." Now, the officer is required to state
specifically some of the facts which the informer told him and some
of the circumstances from which he concluded the informer was
credible or reliable. In many cases, this disclosure will as sufficiently
identify the informer as if his name were given, and thus place him
in danger. The result may be that those people who may have the
most pertinent and reliable information will keep silent. Thus, a very
valuable source of information may well be closed to police officers in
many cases.
Another forceful argument against the Aguilar approach is that
apparently a police officer who has no personal knowledge of the
crime can no longer rely on the unknown informer to furnish
sufficient information to establish "probable cause." If the officer
receives information from such an unknown source, he first must
gain personal knowledge corroborating the informer's information
before seeking a search warrant. It also may be possible for the officer
to satisfy the requirements of Aguilar by checking the reliability of
the informer rather than the credibility of what the informer told
him. This latter possibility could be less time consuming, and therefore an attractive alternative if time were important in securing the
search warrant.
In those cases in which an officer relies on personal knowledge, the
argument is that a magistrate must decide on "probable cause" without benefit of the officer's experience and knowledge. Previously, the
officer often has relied on his previous experience and intuition without stating supporting facts in the affidavit. Now, however, the
affiant cannot rely on a search warrant with the phrase "reliable information of a credible person" as a substitute for a statement of the
facts on which his suspicion actually is based. "Probable cause"
should exist at the time of the issuance of the search warrant and
not after a search has been made. If the officer is unable to state
sufficient facts of his own knowledge which would show "probable
cause," it would seem that the search warrant is now correctly refused. If the officer knows sufficient facts of his personal knowledge,

